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Previous studies of migration in the Southern Balkans have been fragmented not 
only along national but also along disciplinary lines. Moreover, the fields of study 
of ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migration have been separate, with few interconnec-
tions. Our collection intends to bring these different traditions together, and in ad-
dition aims to promote mutual understanding between the citizens of the countries 
of the region, who are now increasingly linked through transnational and globalized 
networks. In order to achieve this goal, the volume adopts a dual approach to the 
study of migration in the area. On the one hand, it focuses on migration flows and 
intercultural exchanges exclusively within the region; on the other hand, it looks at 
contemporary migration against the background of historical developments during 
the last two centuries, while at the same time proposing alternative readings of this 
history. From a methodological point of view, this study reserves a special place for 
aspects of cultural history often lacking in the literature of migration—most nota-
bly, religion, personal name strategies, gender, family strategies, and ‘memory’. It 
takes an interdisciplinary approach to migration—with insights from history, an-
thropology, sociology, economic geography, political economy, and oral history—
and utilizes empirical studies of the societies and polities under examination rather 
than more theoretical elaborations. Our aim is to go beyond the narrow focus of 
national narratives that have dominated historiography in the region, by identifying 
transnational or trans-regional bonds from Ottoman times until the present day and 
also by bringing in comparative perspectives, where appropriate. We consider that 
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migration patterns, coping strategies of individual migrants, and public discourses 
on migration in the present cannot be explained solely by contemporary develop-
ments, since they are deeply influenced by cultural traditions from the past.
The remainder of this chapter—like the contributions that follow—is organized 
historically. We start with a short discussion of migration in the Ottoman Empire, 
also considering some aspects of the late Ottoman Empire that are relevant to issues 
of migration in subsequent historical periods (such as heterogeneity versus homo-
geneity and the issue of nationalism). This is followed by a brief discussion of the 
implications of World War II and its aftermath for migration in the region. Next, we 
look at migration during the Cold War period and developments since the collapse of 
the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. We conclude by looking briefly at some 
consequences for intra-regional migration of the economic crisis that started in 2008.
1.1  Migration in Ottoman Times
Immigration, emigration, and internal migration all played a crucial role in the his-
tory of the Ottoman Empire. Immigration was a characteristic of the hey-day of 
the Ottoman Empire when many people found a safe haven and better economic 
prospects there. A typical case was that of the Spanish Jews who fled persecution in 
Spain and arrived in large numbers in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, 
settling in urban centres in the Balkans—especially in Salonika and Constantinople 
(Mazower 2004, pp. 47–52). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
when the Empire was in decline and disintegrating, many Ottoman subjects (mainly 
Christians and Jews) left for the USA (Ipek and Çagayan 2008). From the very be-
ginning the Ottoman Empire was a ‘moveable empire’, as Kasaba (2009) phrases it, 
and the diverse populations in the Empire were frequently on the move—either vol-
untarily or forced by the authorities. The remarkable population transfers ( sürgün) 
organized by the Ottoman authorities in the early period of the Ottoman Empire 
involved transfers of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish populations within the Empire 
(see, e.g., Hoerder 2002, pp. 111, 113, 117), while the devșirme—the levy of young 
Christian boys for service in the Ottoman army—also implied migration over large 
distances within the Empire, in this case of individuals (Lucassen 2009, pp. 21–22).
Besides these population movements between different parts of the Empire, 
there was also considerable movement within the (Southern) Balkans itself. Sea-
sonal movements of agricultural labourers or of shepherds between winter and sum-
mer pastures, as well as the migration of itinerant artisans and traders, were all part 
of everyday experience. Part of this itinerant population subsequently settled in new 
locations. In Chap. 2, Petko Hristov describes these traditional forms of migrant 
labour, focusing on the Slavic-speaking part of the Southern Balkans and more spe-
cifically on Šopluk and Mijak, two mountainous border regions with a long tradi-
tion of migrant labour. There was also an almost continuous movement from the 
mountains to the plains, or in the opposite direction, depending on the security and 
health conditions prevailing in the Empire. The late Ottoman period saw new mi-
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gration movements. Following the growth of trade in the late seventeenth century, 
thousands of Greek merchants established themselves in the cities in the northern 
part of our region as well as in the Northern Balkans, Central Europe, and southern 
Russia (Vermeulen 1984, p. 230). During the nineteenth century, cities in the Slavic-
speaking regions—previously inhabited mainly by Turks, Greeks and Jews—saw 
their religious and ethnic composition transformed owing to the increasing migra-
tion of Slavic and Vlach speakers (Sahara 2011).
While the creation of nation states erected barriers to the free movement of shep-
herds, itinerant merchants, and all those who wanted to try their luck across state 
borders, it is difficult to get a clear picture of the volume and state regulation of 
cross-border migration within the Southern Balkans in the early phases of state 
formation. Some sources suggest that cross-border migration greatly diminished. 
Fatsea (2011), for example, found no evidence of the presence of foreign labour in 
the Athenian labour market during the founding phase of modern Athens (1830–
1850).1 A clear case of cross-border movement is the migration from the small and 
poor Greek state to Asia Minor in the years immediately after independence (1832). 
This migration—a continuation of migration flows since the eighteenth century—
contributed significantly to the growth of the Greek population there (Adanır 2009, 
p. 64; Kitromilides 2008, p. 287).
1.2  Heterogeneity and Homogeneity in the Southern 
Balkans During the Last Period of Ottoman Rule
The frequent migrations during the Ottoman period contributed to the heterogeneity 
of the Southern Balkans in terms of language, religion and the origin of its inhab-
itants.2 The ‘ethnic’ diversity of the Southern Balkans in Ottoman times is often 
perceived as being due to two factors. The first factor is the large number of ‘ethnic’ 
groups living there—a complex situation that many authors describe using the same 
ethno-national categories as we use today, such as Greeks, Turks, Bulgarians, Serbi-
ans, Montenegrins, Albanians, Gypsies and Jews. Second, these groups did not live 
side by side in neatly separated territories, but were to a large degree intermingled, 
especially in Macedonia and Thrace (see Sax map in the Appendix). Though such 
a picture gives some idea of the ‘ethnic’ complexity and cultural diversity of the 
region, it is potentially misleading, because it applies present-day categories to the 
1 Most of the skilled labour force in the building sector at that time was recruited from the Greek 
islands (Cyclades). Several authors, however, mention the presence of Bulgarian and Macedonian 
workers (masons) in Greece in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see, e.g., Miller 1905; 
Grigorova and Zaimova 2012).
2 Brunnbauer and Esch (2006, p. 14) make the same point for both the Ottoman and Habsburg 
empires.
4past. People at the time did not see themselves in terms of such categories, although 
they slowly learned—and were taught and obliged—to do so.
How did the peasants—the overwhelming majority of the population—see them-
selves before the nationalist world-view reached them? Let us look briefly at the 
Orthodox population of the Balkans.3 Simple peasants at the time would have seen 
themselves first of all as members of a family and village. Next, they would have 
identified themselves as members of a religious community—in our case, the Chris-
tian Orthodox one. The Ottoman Empire was organized into religious communi-
ties, the so-called millets. The Orthodox millet was known as the Rum millet and 
those who belonged to it called themselves Christians or—less frequently—Rum 
(in Turkish), Romios (in Greek), or some equivalent in another Balkan language. 
Though a religious label, the term also had a Greek connotation. The Orthodox mil-
let was dominated by a Greek-speaking elite and the Greek language, called Romei-
ka in Greek at the time, was the language of the church or millet and of the schools 
run by it. Besides the Orthodox millet, there were Jewish, Armenian and Muslim 
ones: each consisted of people speaking different languages. However, peasants 
were not only members of families, villages and religious communities. There were 
many named groups at an intermediate level, between village and religious commu-
nity, such as the Hashiots (very poor, Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians), Dönme 
(Jewish Muslims), Vallahades (Greek-speaking Macedonian Muslims), Gagauzes 
(Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians), and Pomaks or Torbesh (Slav-speaking 
Muslims).
Before the rise of nationalism the term ‘Bulgar’ (or some variant of it) did exist, 
but usually had the connotation of ‘poor Slav-speaking peasant’. Upwardly mobile 
Slav-speakers became Hellenized and no longer considered themselves Bulgars. 
Greek-speakers usually referred to themselves as Romios, but a Bulgar as a member 
of the Greek-dominated Orthodox Church or Rum millet could do so as well (see, 
e.g., Detrez 2013). The notion of ‘Turk’ also had a different meaning than it has to-
day—being used for Muslims, even when their native language was not Turkish but 
Albanian, Greek or Slav. It also had connotations of status. For the Ottoman elite, 
the Osmanlı, the term ‘Turk’ had the connotation of country bumpkin (see, e.g., 
Lewis 1971, pp. 19–20; Mazower 2001, p. 51).
Gellner (1997, p. 20) argues that cultural diversity or differentiation as well as its 
maintenance over time was central to agrarian societies like the Ottoman Empire:
Agrarian society encourages cultural differentiation within itself. Such differentiation 
greatly helps in its daily functioning. Agrarian society depends on the maintenance of a 
complex system of ranks, and it is important that these be both visible and felt, that they be 
externalised and internalised. If they are clearly seen in all external aspects of conduct, in 
dress, commensality, accent, body posture, limits of permissible consumption and so forth, 
this eliminates ambiguity and thus diminishes friction.
Notwithstanding the enormous cultural differentiation and complexity, the student 
of the Southern Balkans can hardly miss the cultural similarities that also existed 
across linguistic and religious boundaries (Detrez 2013), and in this case migration 
3 The following description is mainly based on Vermeulen (1995, 1984). See also Detrez (2013).
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5played a role as well. Weakley (1993, p. 130) provides us with a good example. 
Writing about the houses constructed by Greek itinerant builders over a vast area 
in the Southern Balkans, he comments on people speaking different languages and 
professing different religions:
The differences are seen in slight variations in plan and in certain detail elements…. The 
key design element was a single housing form for a pluralistic and diverse culture (ibid., 
italics original).4
This unity of Balkan culture can be observed not only in architecture, but also in mu-
sic, cuisine, kinship, religious beliefs and practices, and in other cultural domains.5 
Perhaps most remarkable are the linguistic similarities. According to specialists like 
Friedman (2011), the Balkans constitutes a linguistic area with common character-
istics: Balkan languages, despite their diverse origins, show many similarities in 
their grammar, called Balkanisms.6 Perhaps more important for our introduction is 
the domain of religion: there is abundant evidence of syncretic religious beliefs and 
practices in regions where Muslims, Christians and Jews lived in close proximity. 
Syncretism existed in many places in the Balkans and the rest of the Ottoman Em-
pire.7 Remnants of such syncretism still exist in the region and are visible, for exam-
ple, in the sharing of sacred places (Albera and Couroucli 2012; Duijzings 2000). 
In Chap. 7, on Albanian immigrants in Thessaloniki, Ifigeneia Kokkali considers 
syncretism in Albania and Albanian history. In an attempt to explain the remarkable 
way in which Albanians integrate into Greek society—and more specifically the 
role that religion plays in this process—she looks at the context of reception as well 
as Albanian history and the ‘cultural baggage’ that Albanians bring with them. A 
certain ‘syncretic attitude’ towards religion is one element of her analysis.
1.3  Creating National Identities
Before the advent of nationalism, the major identity split in the Balkans was be-
tween Muslims and Christians. Most Muslims were Turkish-speaking, but those 
who spoke other languages were often also called Turks and could identify them-
selves as such. There was a similar correspondence between Christian and Rum. 
4 Slav-speaking and Greek-speaking itinerant builders moved roughly in the same geographic re-
gion. It could well be that the building styles of Greek and Slav-speaking builders differed only 
slightly.
5 Regarding kinship see Kaser 2008. Kaser’s study includes Albania, Macedonia, northern Greece 
(Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia), and the western part of Bulgaria (2008, p. 12). Turkey is not 
included.
6 Balkan linguistics was the first modern approach that ‘attempted to deal theoretically with the 
consequences of language contact’. As a consequence ‘no general work on language contact can 
avoid mentioning the Balkans’ (Friedman 2011, p. 276).
7 Kitromilides (2008, p. 259) refers to the ‘extensive religious syncretism at the grass-roots’ among 
the Greeks of Anatolia and mentions the well-known early study by Hasluck (1929). For the Bal-
kans see, e.g., Stavro Skendi (1967) and Duijzings (2000).
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6In the early phases of Balkan nationalism when the Rum millet was still intact, 
Orthodox Albanian and Slav speakers tended—as Rum—to participate in the Greek 
struggle for independence, though some of them subsequently became fervent na-
tionalists of their own linguistic nation.8 Whatever assimilation existed in the Ot-
toman Empire occurred mainly within the millets. Among native Muslim groups 
this tendency continues to exist in some places to this day. Smaller Muslim groups 
tend to identify with, and to assimilate to, the dominant Muslim minority within a 
particular country or region rather than the dominant Christian majority.9 This il-
lustrates that ‘in many ways the legacy of the Ottoman millet system has endured as 
religion continues to be an important differentiating factor among people’ (Poulton 
1997, pp. 20–21).
The unity of the Orthodox community started to break down when the Greek 
national Church was founded in 1833. The real split came, however, with the foun-
dation of the Exarchist Church in 1878. Although the original goal was ‘only’ to in-
troduce the Bulgarian language in the liturgy, the church soon became an instrument 
in the Bulgarian national struggle. From that moment, Bulgarian-speaking peasants 
were confronted with a difficult choice: to remain in the Greek-dominated Patriar-
chist Church and ‘become Greek’ or to go over to the Exarchist Church and become 
Bulgarian. Whole villages, particularly in areas to the south bordering on the terri-
tory of Greek-speakers, became divided into Greek and Bulgarian parties. Similar 
processes took place in Albanian-speaking and Aromanian-speaking Orthodox vil-
lages (Van der Plank 2004, p. 90; Vermeulen 1984, pp. 242–243). Schools played 
a major role in inculcating a national identity: during the nationalist campaigns in 
Macedonia, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, the 
number of Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian schools increased dramatically.
Greek-speaking Orthodox individuals, belonging to the culturally dominant 
group within the Rum millet, were confronted with such difficult choices to a much 
lesser extent, but even they had to learn to be Greek. As Kitromilides (1989, p. 169) 
writes of the Greek communities in Asia Minor, the identification with the Greek 
nation ‘had to be instilled and cultivated, or “awakened”, as older nationalist histo-
riography might say, through a crusade of national education’. Dragostinova (2008, 
2011) writes in a similar way about the Greeks who lived on the Bulgarian Black 
Sea coast. Though most of these Greeks supported the Greek national idea, they 
had strong ties to their places of birth, were reluctant to emigrate and some opted 
for Bulgarian nationality. Moreover, the Greek government organized there ‘a mas-
sive enterprise of national persuasion by dispatching activists’ (Dragostinova 2008, 
p. 167; 2011, pp. 24–31).
8 Examples are Vasil Aprilov (Stavrianos 2000, p. 371) and Grigor Parlitcheff (Grigorova and 
Zaimova 2012).
9 See, e.g., Marushiavoka and Popov (n.d.) for Bulgaria.
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71.4  Unmixing Populations and ‘Cleaning’ the National 
Territory: Forced and ‘Voluntary’ Migration  
in the Age of Nation State Formation
The rise of nationalism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had great 
consequences for the Southern Balkans. In the early nineteenth century, the entire 
region was still part of the Ottoman Empire; by 1923 the Southern Balkans were 
divided between five nation states—Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania and Turkey. 
Greece was the first to break away with its War of Independence of 1821–1828, 
ultimately achieving recognition of a small territorial state (consisting of Attica, the 
Peloponnese and the Cycladic islands) in 1830–1832. Further territorial expansions 
included the Ionian Islands (1864) and Thessaly (1881).10 Nevertheless, by 1912 
over five million Greeks (mostly Ottoman citizens) remained outside the territory 
in Macedonia, Epirus, Thrace, Asia Minor, Cyprus, the Aegean Islands, Crete and 
southern Russia (Petsalis-Diomidis 1978, p. 15). In 1912 the Balkan League, con-
sisting of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, attacked Ottoman troops in 
an attempt to expel the Ottomans from the peninsula. This was succeeded by the 
Second Balkan War, started by Bulgaria (see below). As a result of these two Balkan 
wars, Greece’s territory expanded massively to include Crete, much of Macedonia, 
Epirus and the Aegean Islands. Sovereignty of the Aegean Islands was finally con-
firmed by the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), although the disastrous Greco-Turkish war 
that followed resulted in considerable loss of territory11 as determined by the 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne.
Following the Greek pattern, Bulgarian revolutionaries engaged in a series of 
uprisings against the Οttomans, but were unable to dislodge Ottoman power. It was 
not until Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire that the peace of the San 
Stefano Treaty (1876) created the first Bulgarian state. This was bitterly opposed 
by the Austro-Hungarian and British empires, and in 1878 the Treaty of Berlin re-
duced the new Bulgarian state to a ‘principality’ that was 37.5 % of its original size, 
returned Macedonia to Ottoman rule and created a new autonomous state of Eastern 
Rumelia—also Ottoman territory (Crampton 2005, pp. 81–83). Just seven years 
later, Eastern Rumelia’s military coup of 1885 reunited it with Bulgaria; this was 
formalized in Bulgaria’s declaration of full independence in 1908. As a result of the 
subsequent First Balkan War, Bulgaria greatly expanded. Dissatisfied with the divi-
sion of the spoils in Macedonia, however, Bulgaria then attacked Greek and Serbian 
positions, thus starting the Second Balkan War. It lost this war, as well as most of the 
10 For a detailed exposition of the evolution of the Greek Kingdom, see Wagstaff (2002, p. 65–112).
11 As a result of Greek military conquest in Western Anatolia after World War I, the Treaty of 
Sèvres confirmed acquisition of most of the Aegean islands and the entirety of Eastern Thrace 
excluding Constantinople, established procedures for the transfer of all Dodecanese islands to 
Greece, and awarded autonomy of Smyrna and the Asia Minor littoral to Greek administration 
under Ottoman sovereignty, along with a procedure for its incorporation into Greece after a period 
of five years (Wagstaff 2002, p. 90).
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8territorial gains obtained as a result of the first war. The net result of both wars was 
not insignificant, though: Bulgaria had obtained Eastern Thrace and its access to the 
Aegean Sea. Ten years later, at Lausanne, it would lose this as well.
Albanian nationalism had no equivalent of the Philhellenism of the European 
elites, or even the pan-Slavist movement in Russia (Vickers and Pettifer 1997, 
pp. 1–2); with no support from the ‘Great Powers’ (i.e., the international commu-
nity), Albanian independence was to be both delayed and fractured.12 From the very 
outset, Albanian aspirations conflicted with Greek ones, and initially this strength-
ened Albanian support for the Ottomans. After the 1908 rise to power of the ‘Young 
Turks’, by 1909 the Albanian Kosovars were in revolt, and by 1911 Kemal had 
agreed in principle to Albanian demands for autonomy—in line with those con-
ceded to other Balkan nationalities (Kondis 1976, p. 54). However, an Albanian 
provisional government was achieved only as a consequence of the two Balkan 
wars and the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest. After a period of anarchy, the borders of 
Albania were finally settled with the Corfu Protocol of 1914.13 Before this could be 
applied, World War I broke out, leaving a poorly-equipped new Albanian state to 
cope with it (Kondis 1976, pp. 132–133, 137).
What is now the Republic of Macedonia14 was for a very short time part of ‘San 
Stefano Bulgaria’ until it was returned to the Ottoman Empire by the Congress of 
Berlin in 1878. After the Balkan Wars, with the Treaty of Bucharest (1913), Mace-
donia was divided between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. When the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed after World War I, it became part of the 
federal state that during World War II was transformed into the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. During both world wars the Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia—as well as Greek Eastern Macedonia and Thrace—was temporarily occupied 
by Bulgaria, which still claimed it as its own. Macedonia gained its independence 
only in 1991, after the break-up of Yugoslavia.
The modern Republic of Turkey is, of course, what remains of the former Otto-
man Empire. As a member of the Axis Powers, the Ottoman Empire belonged to the 
camp of the losers of World War I. In 1919, Kemal Ataturk started a revolt against 
both the Ottoman government and the occupying allied forces: the Turkish War of 
Independence (1919–1923) resulted in the end of the Ottoman Empire and the cre-
ation of modern Turkey.
Carving out more or less homogeneous nation states was not an easy task, es-
pecially in the Via Egnatia region with its mosaic of cultures characterized by hy-
bridity and syncretism. No wonder it became an arduous and cruel process, not-
withstanding the emphasis on heroism and national glory in the historiography of 
12 By 1914, Albania had the support of both Austria-Hungary and Italy, who were keen to limit the 
size and power of a Russian-backed Serbia (Kondis 1976, p. 137).
13 However, this agreement left substantial Albanian minorities in Serbia (Kosovo) and Bulgaria 
(Macedonia).
14 It should be noted that the name of the country remains disputed by Greece, and its constitu-
tional name—Republic of Macedonia—is not recognized by Greece or the UN. The provisional 
name agreed in 1993 was the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, which Greece abbrevi-
ates as FYROM.
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9the  individual nations. Creating homogeneous nation states and national cultures 
required a lot of work in many domains: a national history had to be written and 
the national language, religion and landscape had to be purified—freed from ‘for-
eign’ elements. Religion and national identity became strongly linked, especially 
in Turkey and Greece, with Albania constituting the only real exception. There, 
the continuing co-existence of Islam and Christianity in its Orthodox and Catholic 
variants prevented a close link between national identity and religion while leaving 
some space for the continuation of syncretic attitudes and practices.
Purifying the nation also implied demographic engineering, the unmixing of eth-
no-religious populations, or the ethnic cleansing of the new national territories’ ‘for-
eign populations’ (Sigalas and Toumarkine 2008; Zürcher 2008). Landscapes were 
nationalized by giving places with ‘foreign’ names new, ‘national’ names. Cultural 
monuments that evoked the presence of others were often used for new purposes 
or neglected, if not destroyed. Forced migration and other, more obnoxious, ways 
of ethnic cleansing such as massacres and the burning of villages were recurrent 
phenomena.
In the Southern Balkans, the Greek War of Independence marked the beginning 
of this process, leading to the deaths not only of soldiers but also of many civilians. 
The Greeks, perceiving they were on the winning side, seized their chance and cru-
elly murdered many Turkish civilians—for example, at the massacre of Tripolitsa. 
The Turks took revenge in Constantinople, Smyrna and on the island of Chios (see, 
e.g., Rodogno 2012, p. 66), with this last massacre, especially, gaining much atten-
tion in Europe at the time. Woodhouse (1977, p. 136) concludes, ‘On both sides 
atrocities were appalling.’ Those Muslims who had been able to save their lives 
fled the small independent Greek state and migrated northwards to Ottoman-held 
territory (McCarthy 1995, pp. 10–13). In the Russian-Turkish War (1877–1878) the 
victorious Russian troops, supported by Bulgarian irregulars, took revenge on the 
Turks (McCarthy 1995, pp. 65–81). Large numbers were killed and many fled to 
Ottoman territories. Cities like Thessaloniki and Istanbul were flooded by masses of 
refugees (see Akyalçin-Kaya 2011 for Thessaloniki). According to Mazower (2001, 
p. 11), over the period 1878–1913 some 1.7–2 million Muslims migrated volun-
tarily or involuntarily from the Balkans to what later would become the Republic of 
Turkey. By the 1880s, the Ottoman administration had already sent experts to sensi-
tive border areas such as Thrace to see if refugees could be settled there to make 
these areas more Turkish (Adanır 2006, p. 177).
The two Balkan Wars (1912–1913) mentioned above were a combination of 
fighting, burning villages, massacring people and putting people to flight. As the 
International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan 
Wars wrote, ‘The Turks are fleeing before the Christians, the Bulgarians before the 
Greeks and the Turks, the Greeks and Turks before the Bulgarians, the Albanians 
before the Servians’ (Carnegie 1914, p. 154).
World War I (1914–1918) brought new population movements, mainly as a re-
sult of changing state borders, and was followed by the Greco-Turkish War which 
was at least as violent as the Balkan Wars. Until the Balkan Wars, the main (forced) 
migration movement had been that of Muslims from the Balkans to Turkey. As a 
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result, by 1923 over 20 % of the population of Turkey consisted of people with 
muhacir (that is, refugee) background (Zürcher 2003, p. 6). The wars ‘caused a 
staggering refugee problem that was estimated by independent observers to have 
involved up to three million people’ (Kitromilides 2008, p. 256).
Although a cynic or fervent nationalist would perhaps say that the formation of 
nations and national identities had made a big leap forward after (and as a result 
of) all these wars, violence, ethnic cleansing and mutual hatred had increased as 
well. Those who did not belong to the dominant nation became minorities, and 
usually enemies ‘within the walls’ as well. Moreover, in several cases these mi-
norities lived in border areas, claimed by the neighbour. Under the circumstances, 
the best solution politicians could think of was the exchange of populations—a 
method considered legitimate at the time (see, e.g., Brunnbauer and Esch 2006, 
p. 11). And ‘despite the great human hardship engendered by population exchanges, 
the improvement in regional stability cannot be ignored’ (Barutciski 2003; see also 
Clark 2006, pp. 223–246). The largest and most well-known of these exchanges is 
that between Greece and Turkey (1923) and it is also the one that is best studied, 
though mainly from the Greek perspective. In Turkey there used to be little inter-
est in the exchange, although interest in the topic is increasing (Kitromilides 2008, 
p. 269). The Greek-Turkish population exchange was laid down in the ‘Convention 
concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations’ signed in Lausanne on 
30 January 1923. It came into force when it was included in the peace treaty of Lau-
sanne (24 July 1923). Greeks were defined as ‘Turkish nationals of the Greek Or-
thodox religion established in Turkish territory’ and Turks as ‘Greek nationals of the 
Moslem religion established in Greek territory’ (Hirschon 2003, p. 8). Most Greeks 
of Istanbul and Turks from Western Thrace—about 100,000 in each case—were 
excluded from the exchange. The convention covered all those who had become 
refugees since 18 October 1912. This included about 1.2 million Greek Orthodox 
persons and slightly fewer than 400,000 Muslims. Since many Greek Orthodox 
people had already left Asia Minor over the period 1912–1923, the number actually 
falling under the conditions of the exchange (that is, those leaving after 1923) was 
considerably lower—around 350,000. The corresponding number for the Muslims 
was about 190,000.15
As the Greek-Turkish population exchange is better documented, and also as we 
are more interested in the region where the five states involved in our book bor-
der each other—the area we call the Via Egnatia region, we consider here mainly 
the other two cases of population exchange, between Bulgaria and Turkey and be-
tween Bulgaria and Greece, respectively, agreed in September 1913 and in Novem-
ber 1919. Here we will not go into detail on these exchanges since both cases are 
well-treated in Chap. 3 by Raymond Detrez, who shows how the expulsions and 
exchanges of populations relate to nation-building and irredentist policies. Vukov’s 
15 According to Ladas (1932, pp. 438–439) between 1923 and 1926 189,916 ‘Greeks’—defined 
as Greek Orthodox—were transferred from Turkey to Greece and 355,635 Muslims in the other 
direction. Eddy (1931, p. 201) gives slightly different figures, resp., 192,356 and 354,647. These 
sources—one or both—continue to be referred to in (fairly) recent publications (e.g., Adanır 2006, 
p. 187; Barutciski 2003, p. 28; Hirschon 2003, p. 14).
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contribution (Chap. 4) also relates to the population exchanges in which Bulgaria 
was involved, although his interest is less in the population exchanges themselves 
and more in what happened to Bulgarian refugees from Thrace and their offspring 
long after they settled in Bulgaria. He demonstrates that many people of Thracian 
origin are still involved in Thracian organizations and in claims for compensation 
for lost property.
There is a clear legal difference between the three population exchanges: the 
first two were voluntary, the last one obligatory. Many of the people involved in 
the Bulgarian-Greek and Bulgarian-Turkish exchanges were nevertheless forced 
to leave, either before, during or after the exchange. In practice, the difference is 
one of degree. The main criterion of selection in the Bulgarian-Turkish and the 
Greek-Turkish exchanges was religion. In the language of the day and also in many 
subsequent publications, Turks are said to be exchanged for Greeks; however, the 
selection criterion was not language as West Europeans would expect, but religion. 
The Karamanlides (Turkish-speaking Christians in Anatolia), for example, were 
forced to migrate to Greece; and the Vallahades (Greek-speaking Muslims from 
what is now Greek Macedonia) had to leave Greece for Turkey.
There are some characteristics that these population exchanges have in common, 
and these are points which also recur in the contributions by Detrez and Vukov. All 
three states involved in the exchanges were very keen on ‘cleaning’ border regions 
from populations considered to be a fifth column or ‘foreign element’. The border 
regions were, moreover, considered ideal locations for settling incoming refugees, 
returning kindred peoples from afar. If the original population was removed, these 
refugees could be settled in those houses; and if native but ‘alien’ local groups were 
still living there, they could be induced or forced to leave. It was sometimes con-
sidered important to keep a claim on territories on the other side of the border. In 
these cases, ethnic kin living just across the border had to remain there, rather than 
‘return to the fatherland’ as, for example, in Venizelos’ policy regarding the Greeks 
in Western Thrace when this region came under Bulgarian control (Adanır 2006, 
p. 182). Another recurring theme is that people often had to migrate more than once. 
This happened, for example, to the Greeks on the Turkish coast, to the Bulgarians in 
Thrace, and to the Turks after the Russian-Turkish war. A final point to note is the 
radicalization among refugees—for example, the muhacir, who played an important 
role in the expulsion of Greeks from the Aegean coast before the Greek-Turkish war 
(see, e.g., Van der Plank 2004, p. 73).
Though the exchanges of populations contributed to the security of the region, 
the human price paid for it was tremendous (see, e.g., Clark 2006, pp. 223–246 on 
the Greek-Turkish exchange). Kitromilides (2008, p. 266) sees yet another draw-
back to the exchange of populations as a policy of ethnic cleansing:
By reducing ethnic pluralism through such radical means, the exchange prevented the mod-
ern national societies that emerged from it from learning the skills and internalizing the 
values necessary for the practice of toleration, mutual respect of social groups and recogni-
tion of otherness.
Ultimately, this had consequences for the way that immigrants—not only those 
from other Balkan countries—were received in the 1990s.
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1.5  World War II and its Aftermath
The Axis Occupation, resistance movements and the civil wars of the 1940s had a 
deep impact on the societies of the Southern Balkans. At the end of the decade, the 
establishment of communist regimes in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria led to the 
onset of the Cold War which would seal off Greece from its northern neighbours 
for half a century. Economic hardship, violence and demographic politics led to 
mass migration, both within and across the borders of nation states. Although the 
Occupation created a new situation, some of the issues that had divided Balkan 
nations in the past continued to play a crucial role—territorial claims, irredentism, 
ethnic minorities, and the consequences of the interwar exchange of populations. 
Some of the events of the 1940s are the source of continued tensions between states 
in the Southern Balkans up to the present day, most notably the Macedonian Issue 
and the expulsion of the Albanian-speaking Muslim minority of Greece (Chams) to 
Albania.
The war created a major split between the states: while Albania, Greece, and 
Yugoslavia were occupied by the Axis Powers and developed coordinated resis-
tance movements, Bulgaria actually joined the Axis and facilitated the invasion of 
Greece and Yugoslavia by German troops. Through this move, Bulgarian troops 
were allowed to occupy Serbian Macedonia, the eastern part of Greek Macedonia, 
and Western Thrace. This temporary annexation was seen by Bulgarian nationalists 
as a reunification of the Bulgarian nation. Italian troops occupied Albania and most 
Greek territory, while the Germans occupied Central Macedonia, Athens, Thessa-
loniki and the island of Crete. After the surrender of Italy in September 1943, Ital-
ian-held territory came under German control, but most of Italy’s weaponry ended 
up in the hands of the partisans. In September 1944, following a change of regime 
in Bulgaria, Bulgarian troops evacuated Greek and Yugoslav territory and took part 
in the final battles of the war against Nazi Germany. Turkey remained neutral until 
the last months of the war, when it joined the Allies.
Many of the migration movements during World War II were of a temporary na-
ture.16 Between 1941 and 1943 nearly 23,000 Greek citizens fled to Turkey. Among 
them were soldiers of the defeated Greek army and partisans who had received an 
order to join the Greek forces under the command of the Greek government-in-
exile in Cairo. The rest were refugees from islands of the Northern Aegean who 
fled in panic as the Germans approached or were driven by hunger. They remained 
16 Although the ‘final solution’ enforced by Nazi Germany on the Balkan Jewish population does 
not fit the regional frame of this volume, it would be inappropriate to ignore it altogether. Greece lost 
between 75 and 88 % of its Jewish population (Matsas 1997, http://gjst.ha.uth.gr/el/history.php), 
one of the highest percentages of loss in Europe. In stark contrast to Greece, nearly all Albanian 
and Bulgarian Jews survived the Holocaust, with one exception. In March 1943, about 4,000 Jews 
from Eastern Macedonia were deported by the Bulgarian occupation forces to Bulgaria. From 
there they were sent to Treblinka, where all were killed immediately. Only 60 Jews from Eastern 
Macedonia survived by going into hiding (Kotzayeoryi-Zymari 2002, pp. 155–167; Matsas 1997, 
pp. 75–81).
M. Baldwin-Edwards et al.
13
in Turkey for the rest of the war.17 Similar temporary movements of refugees also 
occurred in the border areas between Greece and its northern neighbours, Albania, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Towards the end of the war, the newly created People’s 
Republic of Macedonia received increasing numbers of refugees from the Macedo-
nian minority in Greece. Among them were many families from the border area, but 
also Macedonian resistance fighters who had served within the ranks of the Greek 
Partisan Army ELAS, as they had been promised equal rights after the war. In May 
1944, however, they came into conflict with the ELAS leadership and joined the Yu-
goslav Partisan Army. In 1945 there were 8,500 Macedonian refugees from Greece 
in Yugoslav Macedonia. The next year, with the outbreak of violence by right-wing 
irregulars, which often specifically targeted Macedonian villages, their numbers 
swelled to 20,000 (Michailidis 2004, p. 46–47).
By far the most important migration waves during the war years occurred as a 
result of the Bulgarian occupation of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace. The 
Bulgarian occupation forces adopted everywhere a policy of forced Bulgarization. 
In contrast to what happened in Yugoslav Macedonia, in Greece these Bulgarization 
policies were particularly harsh, as the majority of the inhabitants, after the interwar 
exchange of populations, were Greek-speaking. People were forced to acquire a 
Bulgarian identity card, an early uprising in September 1941 was bloodily sup-
pressed and Greeks were forced or encouraged to sign applications for ‘voluntary 
migration’ (Aarbakke 2004, p. 38, 2005, p. 167; Kotzayeoryi-Zymari 2002, p. 139). 
Others, especially army officers, academics, and civil servants, were forcibly ex-
pelled (Kotzayeoryi-Zymari 2002, p. 140). As a result of these pressures, about 
150,000 Greeks left their homes and moved west to German-held territory. In 1941 
another 12,000 Muslims from Western Thrace fled to Turkey (Kotzayeoryi-Zymari 
2002, p. 152–155).
Bulgarian authorities further pursued their Bulgarization policies by bringing 
in about 100,000 Bulgarian settlers, many of whom were former inhabitants of the 
region. Associations of Thracian Bulgarians in Bulgaria played an active role in 
these policies. In a proclamation of May 1941 their representatives condemned the 
way in which they had been ‘expelled’ from the area under the Neuilly Treaty and 
claimed the right to return to their homes in the now ‘liberated’ area (Aarbakke 
2004, p. 384). In September 1944 all the settlers returned to Bulgaria, together with 
about 9,000 Bulgarian-speaking residents of the area who became refugees for the 
first time. The stream of refugees from Eastern Macedonia and Thrace continued 
over the following months, and at the end of 1944 there were some 100,000 refu-
gees in Bulgaria (Aarbakke 2004, p. 386).
Even more dramatic was the fate of the Albanian-speaking Muslim minority 
(Chams) of Epirus during the war. In 1940 about 20,000 Chams lived in this area, 
which had become part of the Greek nation state in 1913. Most of them inhabited 
the fertile lowlands, and frictions over land subsequently became a source of con-
flict with their Christian neighbours. Although in 1926 the Chams were exempted 
from the exchange of population foreseen in the Lausanne Treaty, large portions of 
17 Documentary Asia Minor Over Again by Tahsin Isbilen (2008).
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Cham lands were expropriated and distributed to Greek refugees from Asia Minor 
or to local landless peasants. Others sold their properties, being led to believe they 
would be included in the exchange and forced to leave for Turkey. As a result, large 
numbers of the now landless Chams fled to Albania, where they formed a restless 
community. When war broke out in 1940 between Italy and Greece, the Italian 
authorities exploited the feelings of bitterness among the Cham communities both 
in Greece and in Albania and set up special Albanian-speaking military units to 
help them fight first the Greek National Army and later the Resistance. After 1943 
the German army followed their example. Some Chams, however, fought together 
with Greek partisans in the left-wing Resistance units of ELAS. During 1943–1944 
violence escalated and atrocities were committed by both sides. Between June and 
September 1944 the non-communist resistance organization EDES launched a ma-
jor attack on Cham communities, in which about 2,000 Chams were massacred, 
women raped, and mosques and houses burnt to the ground. The survivors of these 
massacres, about 18,00–20,000 individuals, fled to Albania. The Greek census of 
1951 registered only 77 Albanian-speaking Muslims in Greece. After the end of 
communist rule in Albania, the Cham Issue resurfaced, when Cham communities 
in Albania and the diaspora launched an international campaign to reclaim their 
properties.18
The second half of the 1940s produced new waves of mass migration within the 
Via Egnatia area. The establishment of communist rule in Albania, Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria led many Muslims of these countries to seek refuge in Turkey, mainly be-
cause of the restrictions on religious practices (Icdygu and Sert, this volume). The 
largest streams of refugees, however, were linked to the violence of the Greek Civil 
War. By the end of 1947 there were already 25,000 refugees in Albania and 18,000 
in Yugoslavia (Danforth and Van Boeschoten 2011, p. 46). During the same period, 
327 refugees, mostly women and children, arrived in Bulgaria. In 1948 the left-
wing Democratic Army forcefully evacuated villages from border areas under its 
control to Albania and Bulgaria (Danforth and Van Boeschoten 2011, pp. 53–54). In 
the same year, the partisans evacuated about 20,000 children from northern Greece 
to Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (Danforth and Van Boeschoten 2011). After 
the defeat of the Democratic Army in August 1949 the number of political refugees 
who had left the country reached a total of 140,000. However, as the neighbouring 
countries were unable to cope with the enormous flows of destitute and hungry 
people, the majority of the refugees were moved to other countries of Eastern Eu-
rope, where most of them would remain for over 30 years. About 4,500 refugees 
stayed in Bulgaria (Aarbakke 2004, p. 392) and 30,000 in Yugoslavia (Kofos 1964, 
p. 168). Most of the refugees in Yugoslavia were Macedonians who settled in the 
People’s Republic of Macedonia.
In the aftermath of the Greek Civil War, many political refugees were stripped of 
their nationality and their properties were confiscated. Deserted villages of the bor-
der areas—especially those formerly inhabited by Slavic-speakers—were resettled 
18 On the history of the Chams of Greece during the interwar period and the 1940s, see Kretsi 
(2002, 2003) and Margaritis (2005). On the Cham issue today, see Vickers (2007).
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with people from other areas of Greece, deemed to be of ‘healthy national beliefs’. 
Until 1974 the majority of political refugees settled in Eastern Europe were not 
allowed to return to Greece. Therefore, in the 1950s and 1960s tens of thousands 
moved to Bulgaria and Yugoslav Macedonia, in order to be closer to the villages 
of their birth and to enjoy the milder climate. Mass repatriation became possible 
only after 1981 when the Socialist Party PASOK was voted into power. However, 
a decree of 1982 restricted the right of repatriation to ‘Greeks by birth’. Since then, 
many Macedonian refugees have been refused permission to enter Greece even for 
short visits (Danforth and Van Boeschoten 2011, p. 36; Monova 2008). This painful 
legacy of the past is at the core of the Macedonia Issue which has poisoned relations 
between Greece and its northern neighbour.
1.6  The Cold War Period (1947–1989)
The political architecture of Europe that resulted from World War II was absolutely 
central for Balkan countries and their management of borders. The Yalta Confer-
ence had placed Greece unambiguously in the western sphere. Under the Truman 
Doctrine, both Greece and Turkey, despite the latter’s ambiguous position prior to 
and during the war, were increasingly seen as strategically important to the West; 
moreover, the Marshall Plan of 1947 nudged Turkey into a more pro-Western posi-
tion. In contrast, the Balkan countries to the north had all initially fallen under the 
Soviet sphere of influence in 1945: by 1949, Tito had distanced Yugoslavia from 
Soviet influence and received substantial western aid and loans, followed in 1953 
by a friendship treaty with Greece and Turkey (Jelavich 1983, p. 328). Albania 
broke relations with Yugoslavia after 1948 and became the most doctrinaire and iso-
lated country in the region, closely allied with Moscow until 1960, when it shifted 
its allegiance to China (Jelavich 1983, pp. 331–333). Bulgaria was a close ally and 
adherent to Stalinist policies, remaining the region’s closest ally of Moscow right 
until the final collapse of the communist bloc.
Albania became the first regional target of US and British security services, 
which recruited some 300 Albanian dissidents from Greece, Italy and Egypt and 
sent them in as guerrillas to organize anti-communist uprisings over the period 
1950–1952 (Jelavich 1983, pp. 378–379). All were killed, and Albania effectively 
sealed its borders and isolated itself from the entire region until 1991. Thus, there 
was no migration of any sort for the duration of the Cold War.
Greece, despite the largest US investment in the world from the Marshall Plan 
and military aid (Mazower 2001, p. 119), suffered from a very weak economy, even 
with massive capital inflows. This led to extraordinary levels of emigration—ini-
tially to the USA and after 1960 to northern Europe, primarily Germany (Vermeulen 
2008). Migration flows within the region followed the general Balkan pattern of 
ethnic rationalization (i.e., creating a mono-ethnic state), with removal of Greek 
citizenship from minority groups, the emigration of minorities to Bulgaria, Yugosla-
via and Turkey (see Içduygu and Sert, this volume), and the immigration of ethnic 
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Greeks. In particular, as political relations between Turkey and Greece soured over 
Cyprus, the Greeks of Istanbul became vulnerable. Just under a third of them did 
not possess Turkish citizenship, and in March 1964 Turkey denounced the 1930 
Convention on Establishment, Commerce and Navigation and began deportation 
of Greeks on the grounds of national security (Alexandris 1992, pp. 280–281). By 
September 1965, over 6,000 Greeks had been deported from Turkey; many were 
wealthy businessmen who arrived penniless in Greece (Alexandris 1992, pp. 284–
285). The fear of political persecution also led Greeks in possession of Turkish 
citizenship to join the ranks of refugees, and an additional 30,000 were reported by 
the Turkish press as having left Istanbul. Naturally, this had a massive impact on 
the size of the Greek community in Istanbul and contributed to the ongoing ethnic 
rationalization common to both Turkey and Greece.
Yugoslavia was not only a federal state, but a multi-ethnic one in which his-
toric ethnic tensions were suppressed through the overarching ideology of the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia. There were tensions between developed and less 
developed regions, but traditional ethnic rivalries were the major concern. Many 
Muslim Yugoslavs—especially Albanians—took advantage of the improved rela-
tions between Turkey and Yugoslavia after the signing of the Balkan Pact and vari-
ous treaties, and just under 200,000 migrated to Turkey during the Cold War period. 
They consisted of Albanians, Slav-speaking Muslims from Macedonia (Torbesh) 
and Bosnians as well as Turks, but all claimed Turkish descent (see Içduygu and 
Sert, this volume). With the creation of the People’s Republic of Macedonia in 
1943, Yugoslavia addressed the long-standing issue of regional identity (although 
the major part of the historical territory lay in Greece). In 1944 the government in 
Skopje declared Macedonian to be the republic’s language and a commission chose 
a Macedonian local dialect that was the furthest removed from Bulgarian and Ser-
bian (Jelavich 1983, p. 399). An official history and literature were contrived, along 
with an autocephalous Macedonia Orthodox church; ultimately, these resulted in se-
rious tensions with Bulgaria, in particular. From the early 1950s, Yugoslavia tended 
towards economic liberalization along with greater freedom for its citizenry com-
pared with the rest of the communist bloc. Citizens were free to travel, and tourism 
was actively welcomed with few visa controls. Labour emigration was also freely 
permitted. By 1975, persistently high levels of unemployment had resulted in over 
a million Yugoslavs and their families working abroad—representing 20 % of the 
actual labour force still in the country (Jelavich 1983, p. 392). Most were working 
in Germany and Austria, but there was a small presence in almost every European 
country. Yugoslavia was the second largest source country for labour migration 
across Europe, after Turkey (Kupiszewski 2009, pp. 427–429).
Bulgaria had agreed at the end of the war that those parts of Pirin Macedonia 
within Bulgarian territory should be ceded to Yugoslav Macedonia when the Balkan 
federation was established. It even recruited teachers skilled in the new Macedonian 
language that had been selected by the Yugoslav republic (Crampton 2005, p. 190). 
This unpopular policy was immediately dropped when Yugoslavia was expelled 
from Cominform in 1949. Expression of a Macedonian identity was criminalized 
in the 1960s, and the 1965 census was the last one to recognize the Macedonian 
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language (Crampton 2005, p. 199). At the end of the war, pressure to leave was put 
on ethnic Turks in Southern Dobrudja (acquired in 1940), as Bulgaria wanted the 
land for collectivization. Some 156,000 Turks left in the early 1950s (Marushiavoka 
and Popov n.d., p. 46), although there were still about 750,000 remaining in the 
country in 1965 (Jelavich 1983, p. 368). After Bulgaria and Turkey reached agree-
ments in 1968 on family reunification, an uncertain number (114,000 according to 
Marushiavoka and Popov) left for Turkey (see Içduygu and Sert, this volume). The 
largest and most dramatic flow of ethnic Turks to Turkey occurred in 1989, as the 
final stage of an aggressive assimilation campaign that had started in 1984, with 
the criminalization of Turkish dress, language and personal names. Some 350,000 
Turks (including Bulgarian-speaking Muslims or Pomaks) fled to Turkey between 
June and August of 1989 (Içduygu and Sert, this volume). Emigration of political 
dissidents occurred primarily in the immediate post-war period—that is, until the 
early 1950s. According to one source of data, some 8,000 Bulgarian political refu-
gees had been resettled in Europe by the mid-1950s, the largest communities in 
Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey (IOM 2003, p. 13). Despite its strict adherence to 
the Soviet line, Bulgaria did encourage some temporary migrations. In particular, 
starting in the 1960s, Africans were admitted as university students. From the late 
1960s, links with various African countries facilitated large temporary skilled mi-
gration flows out of Bulgaria for doctors, teachers, engineers and others (Crampton 
2005, p. 195). By 1981, there were over 2,000 Bulgarian doctors working in Libya, 
for example, providing much-needed foreign currency and remittances. However, 
there was no regional Balkan labour migration either from or into Bulgaria prior to 
1989.
Turkey during the post-war period became a major emigration country—in par-
ticular as Gastarbeiter in West Germany. In the 1970s, after the oil shocks, Turkish 
emigration started to be directed towards the Middle East (Adaman and Kaya 2012, 
p. 5). Turkey also shifted its immigration policy towards discouragement of im-
migration on the grounds that there was no demographic need. Some ethnic flows 
did occur, primarily from Greece and Bulgaria (see Içduygu and Sert, this volume).
1.7  The Post-Communist Political Upheavals
1.7.1  The Early Migration Phase
Unsurprisingly, the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe had major ramifications for 
the Balkans. With the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the region entered a new phase 
of population movements, encompassing ethnic, refugee and economic migrations. 
Perhaps less obviously, the first country to experience emigration pressures was Al-
bania, which had been the most isolated for the entire post-war period. In June and 
July of 1990, some 5,000 Albanians sought refuge in western embassies in Tiranë 
(Vullnetari 2007, p. 31). Subsequently, thousands crossed the land and sea borders 
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to enter Italy and Greece in an irregular fashion. The total number of those who 
 illegally entered Greece is unknown, but is estimated at over 200,000 for 1991 alone 
(Fakiolas and King 1996, p. 176).
Bulgaria’s transition from communist rule followed the general pattern across 
Eastern Europe, although the fall from power of Zhivkov in November 1989 was 
more the result of a ‘palace coup’ than a popular revolution (Crampton 2005, 
p. 212). One of the first acts of the new regime in December was to revoke the ban 
on Turkish names. This led to the return of a third of the 360,000 who had left for 
Turkey earlier in the year. However, as a result of the sharp economic decline— 
especially affecting the ethnically mixed areas of Bulgaria—an additional 150,000 
ethnic Turks left for Turkey over the period 1990–1991 (IOM 2003, p. 14). The 
removal of restrictions on travel also permitted ethnic Bulgarians to move in search 
of work—especially in Western Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australia. However, 
strict immigration requirements and Schengen visa controls meant that only the 
highly skilled could migrate legally. The majority crossed borders illegally (espe-
cially into Greece) and also were recruited for seasonal agricultural work in Greece 
(see Hatziprokopiou and Markova, this volume). This pattern of irregular and sea-
sonal labour migration extended subsequently to Italy and Spain.
The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the complex 
and brutal civil wars that accompanied it, resulted in massive flows of refugees 
and IDPs (internally displaced persons) from and within the region. By the end of 
1995, 350,000 Croatian Serbs had left Croatia; from Bosnia, more than 2.6 million 
were displaced and 1.2 million found refuge abroad. In 1998, 350,000 fled their 
homes in Kosovo, and the following year 350,000 ethnic Albanians fled to Alba-
nia, 250,000 to Macedonia and 70,000 to Montenegro. Conflict in Macedonia in 
2001 led to 150,000 ethnic Albanians fleeing, mainly to Kosovo (Baldwin-Edwards 
2005, p. 33). Other than the involvement of Albania and Macedonia in these flows, 
the impact on neighbouring Southern Balkan countries was not large. Relatively 
small numbers of refugees arrived in Greece and Turkey.
Greece had acquired an immigrant population over the 1980s—a complex mix 
of legal, semi-legal, and illegal migrants—from various countries including those 
in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. By 1990, it was of the order of 2–3 % of 
total population (Baldwin-Edwards and Apostolatou 2009, p. 235)—reflecting the 
country’s increasing political and economic stability. The Greek political reaction 
to irregular border crossings by Albanians en masse in December 1990 was highly 
negative, and reinforced by near-hysterical reports in the mass media which con-
structed a stereotype of the ‘dangerous Albanian’ (Baldwin-Edwards 2004a). Thus, 
a new immigration law was rapidly drafted to replace the previous one of 1929; its 
primary rationale was the allegation of criminality and the need to protect Greece 
from aliens. The new law made no practical provision for legal immigration, but 
implemented several new mechanisms of expulsion and deportation, as well as im-
plementing major parts of the Schengen Agreement (Baldwin-Edwards and Apos-
tolatou 2009, p. 235). Immediately, the Greek police began mounting regular opera-
tions known as skoupa (broom) to round up undocumented immigrants and expel 
them, generally to Albania. In 1992, 277,000 Albanians were summarily expelled 
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without legal process, and 221,000 in 1993. From 1992 to 1995, 250,000–282,000 
 immigrants (predominantly Albanians) were expelled annually, although there 
were multiple expulsions of the same individuals. Reyneri (2001) has argued that 
this procedure was actually a form of circular migration, since Albanians who 
wished to get a free ride home would ensure that they were detected in the skoupa 
roundups. Small numbers of other nationalities were also expelled, primarily Iraqis, 
Romanians and Pakistanis (Baldwin-Edwards and Fakiolas 1998, Table 7). Despite 
these repressive measures, the stock of unregistered immigrants in Greece (primar-
ily Albanians) climbed rapidly and by 1995 had reached an estimated 600,000 of 
which fewer than 100,000 had legal residence (Baldwin-Edwards 2004b, Fig. 1).
Turkey was a recipient of Muslim refugees from the Yugoslav war—primarily 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (see Içduygu and Sert, this volume). 
While some ethnic migrations within the region continued (e.g., Muslims from 
Greece and Bulgaria), the predominant character of immigration into Turkey began 
to change into that of (unauthorized) labour migrations. In particular, small migra-
tion flows from Albania to Turkey started with the Albanian ‘embassies crisis’ of 
1990, with later family reunifications and other flows. Starting from this period, 
the phenomenon of ‘trader-tourism’ also emerged as an important survival strat-
egy: traditionally practised in East European counties, and involving Turkish goods, 
Bulgarians were particularly well positioned to engage in this economic activity 
(Konstantinov 1996).
1.7.2  The Consolidation Phase (1997–2008): Limited Peace, 
Regularizations and Border Controls
With the Dayton Accord of 1995, it looked as if the Yugoslav war period was over. 
However, in 1998 civil war broke out in Kosovo between Serb and Albanian Kos-
ovars. Some 350,000 people, mostly Albanian Kosovars, fled as IDPs or refugees. 
The following year, 450,000 fled to Albania, 250,000 to the Republic of Macedonia 
and 70,000 to Montenegro. According to Kirişci (2001) about 18,000 fled to Tur-
key. With peace in 1999, some 600,000 returned to their homes in Kosovo alongside 
a reverse exodus of Serbs and Roma who fled to Serbia and Montenegro. Two years 
later, conflict in the Republic of Macedonia resulted in 150,000 ethnic Albanians 
fleeing—mostly to Kosovo (Baldwin-Edwards 2005, p. 33). EU governments have 
insisted on refugee returns to the region, although this simplistic policy choice has 
not been feasible for a variety of reasons. Around one million persons had returned 
by 2005, but this did not undo any of the ethnic cleansing created by war.19
Over this same period, different migration issues emerged in the other countries 
of the region. For Greece, the issue was the ballooning of an irregular immigrant 
population, of which the majority were Albanian. For both Turkey and Greece, there 
was the problem of irregular transit migration. In both cases, the Northern European 
19 See Baldwin-Edwards (2005) for a discussion of policies and outcomes.
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countries put political pressure on the countries concerned to deal with  irregularity 
of all sorts. In late 1999, in the context of improved Greek-Turkish relations, an 
agreement was signed for cooperation in various matters of combating crime. This 
was supplemented by a protocol signed in 2001 detailing readmission procedures 
for irregular migrants. By this point, Turkey’s application for EU membership had 
stalled and Greek-Turkish relations were less comfortable. As a result, Turkey was 
reluctant to implement the protocol and accepted merely 3–8 % of the requested 
readmissions over the period 2004–2006 (Baldwin-Edwards 2006a, p. 120). Im-
proved coastguard patrols from 1999 onward deflected irregular crossings from 
Turkey towards the Greek land border and the River Evros, but the numbers were 
still small in comparison with irregular crossings from Albania. By 2007, detected 
crossings from Turkey were beginning to approach those from Albania at 34,000 
compared with 43,000 (Maroukis 2008, Table 16), and this rising trend continued. 
As the numbers of detected irregular migrants climbed from 2006, there was no 
change in the proportion re-admitted by Turkey; in fact, the highest readmission 
number was in the first year of operation, in 2002, at 645 returns (Içduygu 2011, 
Table 2).
The other major issue was that of visa requirements. Greece had joined Schen-
gen in 1999 (fully implemented from 2000) and was required to enforce the Schen-
gen rules with regard to visas. The other countries in the region followed different 
policies on visas and border controls. All of the countries of the former Yugoslavia 
retained visa-free travel with each other; Albania and the Republic of Macedonia 
granted visas at the border for each other’s nationals; Bulgaria granted visa-free 
travel to citizens of Macedonia (Baldwin-Edwards 2006b); and Turkey allowed vi-
sas to be bought at the border for citizens of almost all countries in the region, with 
the exception of Bulgaria. The visa requirement for Bulgarian nationals was waived 
in 2001, allowing a three-month stay for tourism (see Parla, this volume). This was 
occasioned by Turkey’s partial adaptation to Schengen; Greece also removed the 
visa requirement for Bulgarians in 2001 (see Hatziprokopiou and Markova, this 
volume).
Greece by 1997 had acquired an estimated immigrant stock of some 700,000 of 
which only 60,000 were with legal status (Baldwin-Edwards 2004b, Fig. 1). There 
was considerable political pressure on the government to regularize immigrants—
since the mass deportations of 200,000 a year had failed to prevent rising num-
bers (Baldwin-Edwards and Fakiolas 1998). In 1997 Greece started a two-stage 
regularization programme, which yielded the first hard information about irregular 
immigrants in Greece. Out of a total of 371,641 applicants, 241,561 (65 %) were 
Albanians, 25,168 Bulgarians and 16,954 Romanians. The total number of persons 
covered (including family members) by the White Card awards was 462,067 with 
an estimated 150,000 who did not apply. Regularization programmes were held 
subsequently in 2001 (with a new immigration law), 2005 and 2007. Immigrants 
started to acquire a more secure presence in Greece. By 2006, the second generation 
of immigrants had reached an estimated total of 220,000 with Albanians at around 
110,000–representing 30 % of Albanian residence permits (Baldwin-Edwards 2008, 
p. 38).
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Albanian irregular emigration continued apace, especially to Greece and Italy, 
with another large exodus in 1996–1997 after the economic collapse associated 
with fraudulent investment schemes, the so-called pyramid schemes (Jarvis 1999). 
Whereas the original border crossings into Greece had been over the mountains, this 
was in fact a very dangerous route: mostly men arrived in Greece this way. Women 
and children started arriving in the mid-1990s, mainly through other routes—with 
underground visas, smuggling arrangements and even trafficking. By 2001, the 
predominant mechanism was the purchase of underground visas from the Greek 
consulate in Tiranë (Baldwin-Edwards 2004a, pp. 52–53). By 2010, the Albanian 
population had increased to an estimated 700,000 (Vullnetari, this volume). Barjaba 
(2000) formulated an ‘Albanian model of migration’, consisting of survival emigra-
tion, abnormally high emigration rates, high but decreasing irregularity, volatility, 
back-and-forth migration and strong instability in migrant behaviour. This model 
actually holds for most poor Eastern European former socialist states, including 
Bulgaria (Kupiszewski 2009, p. 446).
Turkey’s geographical position in the region has always made the country—
and Istanbul especially—a major conduit for migration flows from the Middle East 
into Europe. In the 1990s the ‘Southern Balkan route’ through Turkey, then Greece 
and onwards to other EU countries, came under political scrutiny (Içduygu 2004, 
p. 309) with respect to irregular border crossings. The situation of Turks of Bulgari-
an origin is quite fascinating as a case study of both identity and adaptation between 
two countries, in particular, the shift in their status from that of potential citizens to 
systemic irregularity (Parla, this volume). Moreover, with changes in the Bulgarian 
citizenship law in 1998 and 2001, many returned to Bulgaria and applied for return 
of their Bulgarian citizenship. The resulting dual citizenship provided considerable 
advantages—in particular, involving border-crossing and trading of goods. Reports 
suggest that locals on both sides of the border resent what they see as the unfair 
privileges of dual nationals (Özgür-Baklacioglu 2006, p. 324–325).
1.7.3  Post Economic Crisis
Since 2008, the near-collapse of the Greek economy alongside economic depression 
throughout the region (with the exception of Turkey) has altered the character of mi-
gration flows. A large number of Albanians residing in Greece returned to Albania 
over the period 2007–2012. Greek statistics are incapable of revealing the extent of 
this, but reports from Albania suggest a figure of 180,000 returns ( Kathimerini, 15 
Jan. 2013), with potential impacts on the weak Albanian welfare system. Albanian 
border guard reports indicate that 64,060 Albanians returned from Greece in 2007, 
along with negligible numbers from other countries (Gedeshi and Jorgoni 2012, 
Table 1). Limited evidence suggests that the degree of rootedness in Greece has 
been the primary determinant of remaining. Thus, it is mainly single migrants (male 
workers) who return to Albania. Border apprehensions indicate that circular (irregu-
lar) labour migration to Greece has continued, alongside circular migration of those 
with valid Greek permits or citizenship, as well as authorized seasonal employment 
1 Introduction
22
in agriculture (see Vullnetari, this volume). In the case of Bulgarian migration to 
Greece, Bulgaria’s EU accession in 2007 has made cross-border flows, and circular 
migration patterns, far easier. Thus, the labour markets of Bulgaria and Greece have 
become more interconnected, and flows of capital as well as people have increased 
correspondingly (Hatziprokopiou and Markova, this volume).
A similar pattern of increasing circular migration can be found in Turkey, where 
border ‘sticker visas’ have facilitated tourism-trading as well as tourism. From a 
recorded total of just over one million tourist arrivals in 2000, by 2009 Turkey was 
receiving 27 million tourists—of which 2.8 million were from the Western Balkans 
(Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and former Yugoslavia), 5.6 million were 
from the former Soviet bloc, and 2.2 million were from the Middle East (Erder and 
Kaşka 2012, Table 1). Some 32 % gave their reason for visiting Turkey as ‘business’ 
or ‘other’, instead of tourism activities or visiting relatives (ibid., Table 2). With a 
relatively open border policy alongside strict controls on formal employment and 
departure to EU countries, Turkey is an ideal country for informal economic activi-
ties of all kinds; this includes not only tourism-trading, but illegal employment of 
immigrants and acting as a staging post for irregular migration into EU countries. 
It is for this reason that the EU has been negotiating since 2005 to conclude a re-
admission agreement and force Turkey into greater conformity with the Schengen 
provisions—despite its not being a signatory to them (Içduygu 2011). A draft agree-
ment was initialled in June 2012, and signed in December 2013; the EU is demand-
ing full implementation before granting a visa waiver to Turkish nationals visiting 
Schengen countries.
Across the entire region, migration is characterized largely by short-term sur-
vival strategies in a period of weak economic activity, alongside a small residual of 
ethnic migrations. Sometimes, the two are combined. The small labour immigration 
into Albania, for example, is predominantly from Kosovo, Macedonia and Monte-
negro, as well as from Turkey (MARRI 2012, p. 56). There have also been some 
short-term and longer-term migration movements from Albania, Bulgaria and Tur-
key into the Republic of Macedonia throughout the last decade (Kupiszewski et al. 
2009: Annex 1). The principal result of the economic crisis has been to push both 
people and governments into patterns of flexibility, in order to survive the economic 
downturn. The old state-centric model of controlled borders and permanent resi-
dents has lost its validity, at least within the EU and Balkan regions. The exception 
lies in control of borders concerning ‘outsiders’ from Asia and other lessdeveloped 
regions. There, the EU through its agency Frontex, is persisting with the old model, 
and trying to impose it on the EU candidate country Turkey, as well as overseeing 
its implementation in Greece and Bulgaria.
1.8  Epilogue
In compiling this book we have taken a historical perspective, starting from the late 
Ottoman Empire. We have adopted this approach partly because studying historical 
developments in the field of migration is interesting in itself and this makes us  real-
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ize that international migration in the Southern Balkans is not a new phenomenon 
(as is sometimes argued). However, our primary reason for using a historical lens is 
because it aids us to better understand the present. The phenomenon of nation state 
formation in the Balkans necessitated a brutal process of classifying and ‘reorganiz-
ing’ the ethno-national groups inhabiting the region. Several means were used to 
reach the goal of relatively homogeneous nation states—such as ethnic cleansing, 
extermination, expulsion, forced assimilation and population exchanges. The enor-
mous changes that these processes entailed can only be grasped if we realize how 
complicated the ethno-cultural and religious composition was in the Southern Bal-
kans during the last century of Ottoman rule (see Sax map in Appendix). For a long 
period of time, migrations between the countries involved retained the character of 
‘ethnic migrations’—members of ethnic minorities leaving their birthplaces to join 
co-ethnics in another country that was in many ways foreign to them. During World 
War II and the Cold War that followed it, the volume of migration within the region 
was restricted; international migration was directed mainly to Western Europe and 
overseas destinations. Whatever migration there was between the countries of the 
Southern Balkans continued to be of the ethnic type or consisted of political refu-
gees, such as the Greek partisans who crossed the border at the end of the Greek 
Civil War. The major change in migration between the countries of our region came 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Although the collapse of state 
socialist regimes led to a resumption of ethnic migrations, especially the ethnic 
cleansing of the Yugoslav wars, economic migrations also emerged. Greece became 
the focus of intra-regional migration, particularly from Albania and Bulgaria. That 
was a major change since it contributed to ethnic heterogeneity rather than homo-
geneity.
The first three chapters that follow deal with past migrations. In Chap. 2, Petko 
Hristov describes and analyses a traditional system of labour migration known as 
gurbet or pečalbarstvo as it existed in two mountainous regions of the Southern 
Balkans—Šopluk and Mijak. These traditional migration systems, which also ex-
isted elsewhere in the region, have disappeared; yet, despite their differences from 
modern labour migrations, the word gurbet is still used and the memory of these 
past migrations still plays a role in relating to the present. In Chap. 3, Raymond 
Detrez deals with one of the major population movements in the region in the early 
twentieth century—namely Bulgarians from Greece, Turkey and Romania moving 
to Bulgaria. He discusses the role of population exchanges in the process of nation 
building and irredentist policies in interwar Bulgaria. The refugees were used as 
tools for irredentist claims, and the process of adaptation to their new homeland was 
thereby retarded. In the following chapter, Nikolai Vukov looks more specifically 
at the history of Thracian refugees and their organizations in Bulgaria. He also pays 
attention to the revival of activities of Thracian organizations after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the renewed claims to compensation for lost properties and the continu-
ing and revived memories of their homelands.
Chapters 5 and 6 are illustrative of the changes over time. The first of these, writ-
ten by Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Sert, tells the history of migration from the Bal-
kans to Turkey from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. Like  Detrez, 
they relate this history to nation building, but also to economic conditions and spe-
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cific Turkish concerns, such as the perceived need for immigration to compensate 
for a declining population at that time. They also show that after 1990, ethnic mi-
gration decreased and irregular labour migration became more important. This last 
aspect is dealt with in great ethnographic detail by Ayse Parla in Chap. 6. Parla 
shows that over the past two decades the legal status of Turkish migrants from Bul-
garia changed significantly. While in the past they were received as ethnic kin and 
prospective citizens, today they have become dispensable labour migrants moving 
back and forth between Bulgaria and Turkey.
Since the early 1990s, Greece has been the major pole of attraction for prospec-
tive migrants from the Southern Balkans, mainly Albanians and Bulgarians. This 
is why the last four chapters are devoted to Albanian and Bulgarian migration to 
Greece. Ifigeneia Kokkali asks why Albanian immigrants in Greece are so incon-
spicuous, why they seem to change their names and even their religion more eas-
ily than most immigrants. In trying to answer these questions she looks not only 
at discrimination, but also at how history has shaped conceptions about national 
identity among both Greeks and Albanians. She examines several aspects involved, 
such as the strong link between national identity and religion among the Greeks and 
the tradition of religious diversity and syncretism among the Albanians. In Chap. 8, 
Julie Vullnetari takes a very different look at Albanian migration to Greece. Her 
interest is in temporary or circular migration—a topic also addressed by others in 
this volume—and more specifically, seasonal migrants in agriculture. These mi-
grants, drawn from the poorest strata in Albania, constitute an interesting segment 
of the Albanian population in Greece, specifically in view of the renewed interest 
in seasonal labour migration and its relation to the socio-economic development of 
‘sending’ regions. In Chap. 9 , Riki van Boeschoten examines the renegotiation of 
gender identities among Albanian and Bulgarian migrants in Greece. She focuses 
on two major issues that emerge from the life stories of male and female migrants. 
The first is the empowerment of migrant women and disempowerment of migrant 
men, which seems to contradict the ‘patriarchal backlash’ in their home countries. 
The second is the striking differences between the gender identities of Albanian and 
Bulgarian migrant women. Van Boeschoten locates these trends against a backdrop 
of gender relations in Albania and Bulgaria and also the particularities of the mi-
gration process after 1990. In the final chapter, Panos Hatziprokopiou and Eugenia 
Markova examine the development of labour migration from Bulgaria to Greece 
over the past 20 years—placing it in the context of other forms of human and capital 
mobility in both directions. They argue that in this way the Balkan space is regain-
ing the unified character it used to have in the Ottoman period. Greece, in particular, 
is also reacquiring some of the ethno-cultural diversity that used to characterize the 
Balkans—notwithstanding the recent popular hostility to immigration and immi-
grants, not only in Greece but in Europe as a whole.
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